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LET THEM LEARN: RECOGNIZING AND CODIFYING A DESIGNBUILD SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE IN TEXAS
Christian Martinez†
Abstract
Organizations often conduct probing self-studies to review
internally existing policies, procedures, and business methods. Yet,
despite an increasing social need for these studies, the Texas
legislature has yet to construct a privilege designed to protect an
organization from being harmed from these studies by adverse
litigants. The self-critical analysis privilege, or SCAP, is an alluring,
common law doctrine that protects the free flow of information
sharing through an organization’s self-assessment. This Comment
proposes a model statute for the codification of the SCAP for the
consideration of the Texas legislature. This model statute is not a
general codification of the privilege. Instead, the statute is meant to
apply only to Texas’s Design-Build industry. This Comment discusses
the significant policy considerations supporting the SCAP and
analyzes case law to derive proper drafting language. Although this
proposed model statute narrowly applies to Texas’s Design-Build
industry, the hope is to have a workable statute that could apply to
general products, oil and gas, and other property related industries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Texas, the scope of discovery covers “any matter that is not
privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.”1
This means any conclusory opinions based on internal investigations
are discoverable.2 Enter the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
(“SCAP”), which shields the “opinions and recommendations of
corporate employees engaged in the process of critical self-evaluation
for the purpose of improving health and safety.”3
The SCAP may be one of the most misunderstood common
law protections.4 It has applied very narrowly to hospital committee
reports, certain business investigation reports, and some Title VII

1. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).
2. See generally The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, Note, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1083 (1983).
3. Felder v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 153 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224–25
(D.D.C. 2015).
4. Hardy v. N.Y. News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying
the privilege to certain communications only after noting that “several courts have
raised serious questions about [its viability]”).
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actions.5 Largely, courts refuse to acknowledge the existence of the
SCAP outright.6 This Comment argues that the SCAP should be
adopted in Texas to allow businesses to candidly make improvements
in the quality and safety of goods and services.
The premise of this Comment’s argument is that businesses do
not have the appropriate incentives to take the steps to improve
themselves absent the SCAP.7 But this Comment does not argue for,
as others have, a broad SCAP statute applicable to all industries.8
Rather, this Comment urges an adoption of the SCAP solely to those
internal reports used in the Texas architecture and construction
(“Design-Build”) industry.
Although there are many benefits to having the SCAP, this
Comment understands a wide adoption would likely not be feasible in
light of the significant policy concerns other scholars have rightly
pointed out.9 These concerns impacted the decision to narrow the
SCAP to the Design-Build industry. The hope, however, is that the
SCAP’s success in the Design-Build industry will eventually be
adopted to the products-liability, oil and gas, or other property related
industries in Texas.
Fortunately, Texas’s Design-Build industry presents ample
ground for development and would massively benefit from the
SCAP.10 As shown in Part II of this Comment, the Design-Build
industry is adopting “lessons-learned” policies to create safe and
innovative work environments inside and outside of the field.11 These
lessons-learned policies effectuate the same policy rationales
underlying the SCAP.12
Part III will compare and contrast the federal and Texas
privilege laws to derive guidance and support for a proposed statute.13
For reasons discussed in Part III, the Texas Legislature must codify
the SCAP.14 As such, this Comment will also discuss various
5. The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 2, at 1090–91.
6. Id. at 1091.
7. See generally David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical
Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (1988).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 2, at 1091.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part II–III.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Id.
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approaches the language of a proposed SCAP statute could take. Part
IV will discuss the SCAP in detail and explore its application in a
myriad of industries, drawing important lessons from case facts and
court rationales.15 Part V will discuss the ineffectiveness of other
privileges to further the needs of Texas’s Design-Build industry.16
Finally, Part VI and VII will conclude with the proposed statute, using
the rationales developed throughout this Comment.17
II. TEXAS DESIGN-BUILD INDUSTRY AND LESSONS-LEARNED POLICIES
In 2018, Texas contributed roughly $1.8 trillion to the total
U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) of $20.6 trillion.18 Texas
Design-Build projects contributed $94.2 billion (approximately 5.3%
of Texas GDP).19 In 2019, the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex was the
second-busiest building market in the country, totaling $22.5 billion.20
Only New York City had more total construction.21 Astoundingly, this
was the fourth year in a row north Texas construction broke $20
billion, with nonresidential commercial projects rising 14% from
2018.22
As with most booming industries, the estimated cost of
industry-related litigation is expected to rise.23 There are two main
reasons why litigation expenses may rise in Texas. First, Texas has a
horrid reputation for construction worker safety.24 The payout for
these types of claims can rise to astronomical levels; for example, a
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI–VII.
18. Ken Simonson, The Economic Impact of Construction in the United States
and Texas, ASS’N GEN. CONTRACTORS AM. (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.agc.org/learn/construction-data/state-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/39GD-JP2N].
19. Id.
20. Steve Brown, Dallas-Fort Worth’s Construction Boom Ranks Second
Nationally in 2019, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:14 AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/real-estate/2020/02/11/d-fw-was-a-top-usmarket-for-construction-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/HE2E-Q8XU].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Jeffrey Kozek, Five Construction Litigation Trends for 2019, THE BUILDER
ONLINE: BLOG (Jan. 3, 2019) https://www.builderonline.com/building/fiveconstruction-litigation-trends-for-2019 [https://perma.cc/5253-DCVR].
24. See Gus Bova, Texas Workers Are Dying on the Job at Alarming Rates, TEX.
OBSERVER (July 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/texasworkers-are-dying-on-the-job-at-alarming-rates/ [https://perma.cc/TE2B-93LD].
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Texas jury awarded a construction worker $44 million in damages in
connection with injuries that he sustained while working.25 Second,
the overall number of construction defect cases has exploded for the
past two decades and will no doubt cause many more claims in
Texas.26 This will be especially true because many Design-Build
contractors are hiring less experienced workers whose work often
results in defect claims.27
Adoption of lessons-learned policies could prevent the causes
of increased litigation expenses.28 The idea of these policies is simple:
Like individuals, business organizations cannot afford to keep making
the same mistakes again and again.29 Businesses, however, cannot
readily collect, analyze, store, disseminate, and reuse previously
acquired knowledge from their memories as an individual can.30 This
is because human memory reflects the individual’s natural ability to
gain, store, and retrieve knowledge.31 Whereas, organizational
memory refers to the collective ability to accumulate, store, and
retrieve knowledge.32
As such, organizational memory relies on employee
experience and knowledge.33 Without a repository to store collective
knowledge, the organizational memory may vanish through employee
turnover.34 In an attempt to preserve and maintain organizational
25. John Chapman, Houston Construction Worker Awarded $44 Million Verdict
for Leg Amputation Caused by Crane Accident, HEYGOOD, ORR, & PEARSON (May
15, 2015), https://www.hop-law.com/houston-construction-worker-awarded-44million-verdict-leg-amputation-crane-accident/ [https://perma.cc/B7CU-G3ZH].
26. See generally Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Notice and Opportunity to Repair
Construction Defects: An Imperfect Response to the Perfect Storm, 43 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. L.J. 729 (2009).
27. Kozek, supra note 23.
28. See generally Ximena Ferrad et al., A Lessons-learned System for
Construction Project Management: A Preliminary Application, 226 PROCEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 302, 303 (2016).
29. Stephanie A. Trevino & Vittal S. Anantatmula, Capitalizing from Past
Projects: The Value of Lessons Learned, PROJECT MGMT. INST. (July 16, 2008),
https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/business-benefits-value-lessons-learned-7116
[https://perma.cc/X7H3-9H73].
30. Id.
31. Organizational Memory – Definition and Meaning, MKTG. BUS. NEWS,
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/organizational-memorydefinition-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/KWK4-WLEP] (last visited May 18, 2019).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Organizational
Memory,
BUS.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organizational-memory.html
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memory and to prevent reinventing the wheel regarding projects with
overlapping characteristics, businesses are implementing lessonslearned policies.35 These policies allow the business to improve and
reduce costs by learning from past projects and incorporating those
lessons into new projects or policies.36
The practice of capturing and archiving knowledge is not
new.37 The concept of lessons-learned, however, has evolved into a
formal and structured management practice.38 In general, the practice
requires two essential activities: capturing important lessons from
projects and making effective use of them.39 As such, lessons-learned
policies often require businesses to document both the success and
failures of a project.40
The Design-Build sector is a prime field for the adoption of
lessons-learned policies.41 Design-Build companies are project-based
organizations, because much of their knowledge is generated on site
from projects they carry out.42 Projects are an important source of
expert know-how and organizational knowledge.43 As such, the
Design-Build industry is actively attempting to incorporate lessonslearned policies into the business model.44
In essence, lessons-learned policies in the Design-Build
industry are a way for companies to learn from their mistakes and take
the steps necessary to prevent worker harm or construction defects. As
these are the main reasons why costs of litigation will increase, the
industry should feel free to implement lessons-learned policies
without fear of their conclusions being discovered. As will be explored
below, the primary rationale underlying the SCAP is to prevent the
“chilling effect of disclosure.”45 Thus, the industry seems to be in the

[https://perma.cc/7MV2-4FWR] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
35. Trevino & Anantatmula, supra note 29.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Ferrad et al., supra note 28, at 305.
42. Id. at 302.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 303.
45. Josh Jones, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the SelfCritical Analysis Privilege, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1638–39 (2003) (citing
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 382 (N.D. Ga. 2001)).
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best position to benefit from the SCAP as it is attempting to use selfdisclosure to improve services for others.
III. THE LANDSCAPE OF PRIVILEGES
Privileges “reflect societal choices that certain relationships or
activities (such as seeking legal or medical advice) should be valued
above others.”46 “[S]ociety needs privileges because in their absence,
individuals will be discouraged from engaging in certain socially
desirable behavior.”47 For example, the attorney-client privilege “is
the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to
the common law.”48 Its purpose is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients, thus promoting
broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice.49
Yet, there are clear reasons against adopting privileges. As
Justice Scalia noted, “justice . . . is severely harmed by contravention
of ‘the fundamental principle that “the public has a right to every
man’s evidence.’”50 As such, “[privileges] are not lightly created . . .
for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”51 This conflict
between the need for privileges and the need for compulsory
disclosure demonstrates how arguments for new privileges, such as
the SCAP, should be well-reasoned and account for the right to every
man’s evidence as well as incentives to encourage socially desirable
behavior.
This Comment analyzes arguments for and against adopting
the SCAP in Texas. First, this Comment discusses the federal rules
covering privileges; this discussion highlights the benefits of a flexible
common-law-based system of privileges. Second, this Comment
reviews the legal landscape of privileges in Texas. In doing so, this

46. Pam Jenoff, The Case for Candor: Application of the Self-Critical Analysis
Privilege to Corporate Diversity Initiatives, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 569, 576 (2011).
47. Id. at 577.
48. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
49. Id.
50. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed.
1940)).
51. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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Comment will explain how the SCAP can be adopted and why it
should be adopted.
A. Federal Rules on Privileges
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”),
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.”52 Thus, the question becomes: Which matters are
privileged, and which matters are nonprivileged? Federal Rule of
Evidence (“FRE”) 501 answers: “The common law—as interpreted by
United States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a
claim of privilege.”53 The language of the rule shows that “Congress
turned its back to the idea of codified privileges and decided that its
evolution will be governed largely by federal common law.”54
In addition to the rule’s plain language, the legislative history
of FRE 501 shows the intent to support the development of common
law privileges.55 To start, the original FRE Article V proposal to
Congress contained thirteen rules.56 In its original form, Article V
bound the courts to honor nine different non-constitutional
privileges.57 These nine privileges protected government-required
reports, lawyer-client conversations, psychotherapist-patient
conversations, husband-wife conversations, communications to
clergymen, political vote privacy, trade secrets, secrets of state and
other official information, and the identity of informers.58 Further, in
its original form, Article V bound the federal courts to only recognize
the privileges laid out in Article V or specified by Congress.59
Yet, the committee amended Article V to eliminate most of the
specified privileges.60 Instead, the finalized Article V turned solely
into FRE 501, leaving United States courts to develop the law of

52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
53. FED. R. EVID. 501.
54. PAVEL WONSOWICZ, EVIDENCE: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 494
(Michael H. Schwartz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
55. Id.
56. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee notes to 1974 enactment.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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privileges.61 The advisory committee justified this position in response
to psychiatric organizations arguing against the deletion of one of the
nine aforementioned privileges—the privilege on psychotherapistpatient relationships. Here, the advisory committee declared:
[I]n approving [FRE 501], the action of Congress
should not be understood as disapproving any
recognition of . . . any other of the enumerated
privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules.
Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting
the view that the recognition of a privilege . . . should
be determined on a case-by-case basis.62
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court found FRE 501 did
not freeze the law governing privileges of witnesses but instead
directed federal courts to “continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges.”63 In Jaffee, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a privilege protecting confidential communications between
a psychotherapist and her patient “promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”64 The Court
applied “reason and experience” in accordance with FRE 501, finding
the standard promoted the idea that “the common law is not immutable
but flexible.”65 In doing so, the Court upheld the decision to protect
the notes concerning a patient and her therapist, thus crafting a
privilege within the federal common law.66
Further, FRE 501 recognizes the need for individual states to
develop their own rules on privileges. FRE 501 states, “in civil cases,
state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which
state law supplies the rule of decision.”67 The advisory committee
notes the rationale of this provision is that “federal law should not

61. Id. (FRE 502 was later added in 2007 specifying the attorney-client and
work-product privileges).
62. Id.
63. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
64. Id. at 9–10.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id. at 10.
67. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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supersede that of the states in substantive areas such as privilege.”68
Further, there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure
from state policy.69
B. Texas Rules on Privileges
Texas holds a stricter, less flexible approach than the federal
framework, resembling the original FRE Article V proposal.70 Texas
intermediary courts are prohibited from recognizing and creating
common law privileges.71 In fact, Texas Rule of Evidence (“TRE”)
501 explicitly states that no privilege shall be recognized unless it
derives from “a Constitution, a statute, . . . or other rule[] prescribed
under statutory authority.”72 Texas seems to have adopted this strict
approach with the recognition that “privileges expressly subordinate
[the] goal of truth-seeking to other societal interests.”73
Some Texas lawyers argue the state should adopt the federal
approach or, at the least, recognize privileges already established
under the federal common law. For example, In re Andrew Silver
involved a contract dispute relating to the “Ziosk.”74 This device
allowed restaurant patrons to order meals, play games, and pay checks
at a dining table.75 The court inquired into whether the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to adopt the patent-agent privilege.76
At the time, the patent-agent privilege was recently recognized by the
federal courts.77 The court noted federal courts hold the ability to
expand and create privileges under FRE 501, however, no court in
Texas holds such ability.78 Citing additional rationale against
privileges, the court refused the patent-agent privilege.79

68. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment.
69. Id.
70. TEX. R. EVID. 501 et seq.
71. TEX. R. EVID. 501; In re Silver, 500 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2016, no pet.).
72. TEX. R. EVID. 501.
73. Ludwig v. State, 931 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
74. Silver, 500 S.W.2d at 642.
75. Id. at 645.
76. Id. at 646.
77. Id. at 645–46; In re Queen’s Univ., 820 F.3d 1287, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
78. Silver, 500 S.W.2d at 646.
79. Id. at 647.
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Although there is a ban against judge-made privileges, Texas
has still managed to create numerous privileges through the legislature
alone. Some people have even commented the Texas Legislature
“seems perpetually bent on creating more statutory privileges.”80 Yet,
because of Texas’s recodification process, these privileges are
incredibly difficult to piece together without the proper sources
because they are scattered about varying subject-matter codes, causing
many litigants to default to only those privileges found in the TRE.81
For example, many researchers will look to the Health and
Safety Code to find the “medical committee” and “peer-review”
privileges.82 In that code, the researcher will find the section stating
medical committees’ records and proceedings are confidential and not
subject to a court subpoena.83 Without the proper research or practice
guide, the researcher will likely miss the applicable exception to the
privilege found in the Occupation Code, stating the privilege will not
apply to civil rights or anticompetitive actions.84 This dilemma has
caused some to say, “finding any sort of privilege within
the codes is as easy as finding a needle in a haystack.”85 This
complicated privilege scheme, in turn, causes some of these privileges
to generate a fair amount of litigation,86 while others are lost in the
statutory thicket.87
Further, Texas limits the use of privileges by incorporating the
offensive use doctrine into its law.88 The concept of the doctrine is that
evidentiary privileges are meant to be used as shields, not swords.89
Under the offensive use doctrine, a party seeking affirmative relief
may not use a privilege to prevent an opposing party from discovering

80. STEVEN GOODE & OLIN G. WELLBORN III, GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF
EVIDENCE—TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES § 501.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated
May 2019).
81. Ellen Desrochers, That’s Privileged! Or Is It?: Uncovering Lost Privileges
and Exceptions in Texas Codes, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 2 (2014).
82. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.031–.033.
83. § 161.032.
84. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007.
85. Desrochers, supra note 81 at 21.
86. GOODE & WELLBORN, supra note 80.
87. Desrochers, supra note 81 at 5.
88. William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide § 90.06, LEXIS (database
updated March 2020).
89. Id.
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outcome-determinative information regarding the nature of the
claim.90
Thus, it appears Texas has imposed its own measures to limit
the use of privileges. By refusing the federal approach and vesting the
power to create privileges largely with the legislature, privileges are
not allowed to freely and flexibly develop under Texas common law
principles. And although the legislature has created numerous
privileges, it has scattered them throughout a complex system of
subject-matter codes rendering it increasingly difficult for litigants to
use them.
C. Fitting into the Texas Framework
As discussed above, the Texas and federal landscapes differ as
to the development of new privileges.91 The federal system allows the
development of privileges through the courts in light of reason and
experience.92 Whereas, Texas prohibits the creation of court-crafted
privileges, vesting the power to create and recognize privileges largely
with the legislature.93 The SCAP developed under the federal
system.94 Thus, the rationales supporting the SCAP found in the
federal court system will not be enough to support its creation in the
Texas system because they were expounded under a framework
supporting flexibility.
So, what Texas-specific policy considerations can be added to
the rationales originally supporting the SCAP? Recall the dilemma
explored above concerning the numerous statutory privileges found in
Texas.95 The sheer number of privileges in Texas does not necessarily
mean the state legislature acts in similar accordance to the courts in
the federal system. But consider the following: Texas recognizes a
chiropractor-patient privilege, a podiatrist-patient privilege, and a
veterinarian-patient privilege.96 These privileges evidence the
legislature’s willingness to adopt many privileges so long as they are

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Tex. 1985).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See supra Part III.B.
GOODE & WELLBORN, supra note 80, at § 501.1.
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narrow in application. For this reason, a proposed codification of the
SCAP will work if it is confined to the Design-Build industry.
Further, recall the issue discussed above concerning the
medical peer-review privilege.97 There, a privilege exception was
found within the Texas Occupation Code, despite the fact that the
privilege was placed in the otherwise appropriate Health and Safety
Code.98 The exception to the peer-review privilege disallowed the
privilege in civil rights or anticompetitive actions.99 From this
example, one can see an additional policy consideration that will
support the adoption of the SCAP. The SCAP should be flexible and
incorporate, or be designed to incorporate, exceptions found in
different subject-matter codes.
This seems fitting for a privilege designed solely for the
Design-Build industry because many of Texas’s construction and
architecture statutes are already scattered about different subjectmatter codes.100 Many of these laws reflect specific requirements for
certain types of Design-Build projects one can undertake.101 With
construction and architecture statutes being strewn about the varying
subject-matter codes, the SCAP would be readily capable of working
with and across different codes.
Finally, additional policy support comes from those Texas
privileges already in place. The state legislature recognizes the need
for doctors to be evaluated without fear such evaluations will lead to
litigious recourse. This is recognized through the medical peer-review
privilege, as referenced above. The medical peer-review privilege
“extends to the committee’s initial and subsequent credentialing
decisions, as well as documents ‘generated’ by a committee or
‘prepared by or at the direction of the committee for committee

97. See discussion supra Part III.B.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For construction see TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 53.202 & 53.284; TEX. INS. CODE
§ 151.102–.104; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 272.001. For architecture see TEX. OCC.
CODE ANN. §§ 1051.001–.801 (Architecture Practice Act); TEX. PROP. CODE §
201.011; TEX. GOV. CODE § 2166.408.
101. See TEX. GOV. CODE § 311.023; TEX. EDUC. CODE § 44.038; TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE § 17.44 et seq. (Texas Residential Construction Liability Act).
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purposes.’”102 The underlying rationales of the medical peer-review
privilege are practically the same as the SCAP.103
Similarly, Texas recognizes another statutory privilege to
shield the collection, compilation, and analysis of nursing home
care.104 This “nursing home” privilege also incorporates a peer-review
mechanism.105 In fact, this peer-review requirement led to the court’s
decision in Capital Senior Mgmt. 1, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs.106 There, the operator of a nursing home sued Human Services
to prevent disclosure of information regarding the nursing home.107
The documents included investigations regarding complaints of abuse
and neglect.108 The court held the operator did not engage a deliberate
peer-review and simply gave the documents to Human Services as
required.109 Because of the lack of deliberate peer-review, the court
allowed Human Services to disclose the information.110
With Texas’s peer-review privileges in mind, a statute for the
SCAP should specify that deliberate communications are protected.
Like the peer-review privileges mentioned above, the deliberateness
of the communication ultimately dictates whether the SCAP will
attach or not. The state legislature can readily include this requirement
in a proposed statute. As discussed below, this requirement would also
square nicely with previous decisions interpreting the SCAP’s
applicability in certain situations.

102. Zenith Ins. v. Texas Inst. for Surgery, 328 F.R.D. 153, 163 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (citing In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 698–700 (Tex.
2015)).
103. Richard L. Kaiser, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege for Products
Liability: What Is It, And How Can It Be Achieved in Wisconsin?, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
119, 120 (1999).
104. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.049(d)–(e).
105. Capital Senior Mgmt. 1, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 132 S.W.3d 71,
79 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 73.
108. Id. at 75.
109. Id. at 79.
110. Id.
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IV. THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE
A. Development
As stated above, Congress did not intend to “freeze the law of
privilege.”111 Instead, FRE 501 provided the courts with “the
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,” and
“leave the door open for change.”112 This flexibility allowed the
federal system to recognize the SCAP.113
The SCAP “is designed to protect the opinions and
recommendations of corporate employees engaged in the process of
critical self-evaluation of the company’s policies for the purpose of
improving health and safety.”114 In essence, the SCAP “seeks to
encourage candid self-criticism,” and “prevent[s] a ‘chilling’ effect on
self-analysis and self-evaluation prepared for the purpose of protecting
the public by instituting practices assuring safer operations.”115 Thus,
the SCAP is based on the rationale that society benefits when a party’s
employees engage in critical evaluations of the party’s conduct,
unfettered by the fear that such comments may be discoverable and
used adversely.116
The SCAP was first recognized in Bredice v. Doctors Hosp.
during a medical malpractice suit.117 The court in Bredice denied
access to the minutes and reports of a hospital staff meeting, stating
that “[t]here is an overwhelming public interest in having those staff
meetings held on a confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and
advice can continue unimpeded.”118 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed
the Bredice decision without opinion.119 Thus, the SCAP generally

111. Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
112. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974)).
113. MaryAnn Joerres, Privileges and the Oil Patch, 18TH ANNUAL ADVANCED
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW COURSE, CH. 6, 14 (2000),
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/2137/47843_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7DF-HBSL].
114. Felder v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 153 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224–25
(D.D.C. 2015) (citing Granger v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 116 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D.
Pa. 1987)).
115. Id. at 225 (citing FTC v. T.R.W., Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
116. Id. (citing Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992)).
117. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
118. Id. at 251.
119. Joerres, supra note 113, at 14.

2021]

LET THEM LEARN: RECOGNIZING AND CODIFYING

245

applied to records containing internal evaluations that, if produced,
would impede the candid discussion of ideas.120
The extension of the SCAP beyond the medical malpractice
area is slow and often narrowly drawn.121 Some federal courts adopt
the SCAP in a limited capacity while others have never even heard a
case concerning its application.122 Generally, it appears courts are
increasingly unreceptive to the SCAP.123 Some courts have even held,
“it is unclear whether a federal self-critical analysis privilege exists”
because of its inconsistent success rate among the various circuit
courts.124
Indeed, the Northern District of Texas merely referenced the
SCAP when attempting to balance the value of making documents and
communications discoverable with the corporation’s interest in selfinvestigation and preparation for litigation.125 The Fifth Circuit also
refused to recognize the SCAP when a government agency sought
certain documents.126 However, in that case, the Fifth Circuit declined
to rule whether the SCAP may be recognized under different
circumstances.127
Despite the utter lack of enthusiasm, jurisdictions have
successfully applied the SCAP in a variety of contexts: such as
workplace safety, products liability, legal compliance for
pharmaceutical companies, police department safety reviews,
securities litigation, and libel.128 Additionally, many states have
adopted statutes in some form of the SCAP in a narrowed and
particular capacity.129 For example, most states utilize a peer-review
system for hospital incident reports.130 One thing is certain, however,

120. Id.
121. See id. at 14.
122. Id.
123. CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION §§ 6.01 FN 1,
6.03 LexisNexis (database updated May 2019) (The SCAP is also known as selfevaluation privilege, self-evaluative privilege, or the privilege of self-critical
evaluation).
124. Id.
125. In re LTV Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 621 n.22 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
126. In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000).
127. Id.
128. CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, supra note 123,
at § 6.01.
129. Kaiser, supra note 103, at 120.
130. Id.
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the SCAP is limited to evaluations and does not protect the underlying
facts.131
B. Specific Circumstances and Uses
Case law can be a valuable tool to understanding potential
paths a proposed statute could take. Fortunately, the SCAP has been
found to apply in multiple industries—despite the small rate of use.
Using these cases, this Comment hopes to find key language and
approaches that a proposed statute could utilize.
1. Government Reports
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts addressed the applicability of the SCAP in the context
of government-mandated reports.132 In Block Island Fishing, Inc., a
lobster fishing boat crashed into a tanker.133 The owner of the fishing
boat filed suit, seeking a determination limiting his liability.134 More
importantly, however, the owner of the tanker asserted the SCAP to
exclude deposition testimony evidencing the conclusions of a postaccident investigation report.135 This report was mandated as part of
an international treaty.136
Adopting the four-part test outlined in O’Connor v. Chrysler
Corp., the court found the SCAP applied.137 Under the O’Connor
four-part test, or “potential guidepost” for application, the SCAP
applies when: (1) the materials are made pursuant to a mandatory
government report; (2) its application is limited to only subjective,
evaluative materials; (3) its application does not protect objective data
in those same reports; and (4) the requesting party’s need for such
materials does not outweigh the need for protection.138 The court
131. Id. at 125.
132. Kelly J. Bundy, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege: Under Construction or
Built on Shaky Ground?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_con
struction/2019/spring/self-critical-analysis-privilege/
[https://perma.cc/KUZ53LXS].
133. 323 F. Supp. 3d 158, 160 (D. Mass. 2018).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 162.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 161 (citing O’Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 217 (D. Mass.
1980)).
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allowed the privilege to stand, finding the post-accident report
satisfied the four-part test.139 That the report was part of a mandated
international treaty, thus satisfying the first prong, was likely
dispositive to the SCAP’s applicability.140
The case is useful for discovering a potential, albeit very
limited, pathway the proposed statute could take. The statute could be
written to conform with the four-part test outlined in O’Connor,
protecting only internal investigations compelled by the government.
This path could limit the potential cost of litigation in workplace or
accident lawsuits, but the goal of the SCAP is to allow for internal
assessment for the sake of self-improvement. A statute protecting only
mandated investigations and reports would not protect ordinary costsaving measures such as lessons-learned reports and would require the
government to determine what is worth improving—not the DesignBuild company.
2. Environmental Compliance
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida addressed the applicability of the SCAP in the context of a
chemical company’s environmental compliance reports.141 In
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., the court extended the
privilege to retrospective environmental reports.142 The reports
analyzed past conduct, practices, and occurrences relating to past
pollution.143 The court noted a strong public interest in promoting the
voluntary identification and remediation of industrial pollution
because pollution poses a serious public health risk.144
Fortunately, the Texas Environmental Health and Safety Audit
Privilege Act provides an environmental “audit report” is
privileged.145 This “audit report” essentially would allow a business to
protect the same type of report protected in Reichhold Chems. without
the need for an additional SCAP statute.146 As such, Texas has
welcomed the court’s conclusion that environmental compliance can
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 162–63.
Id.
Reichhold Chems. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 526.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 1101.001, .101 (2019).
Id.
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be readily incentivized by the SCAP. As such, this Comment posits
Reichhold Chems. stands for the general proposition that a business
should be allowed to evaluate compliance with the law on the whole,
rather than simply allowing businesses to assess compliance with
environmental regulations.147
In the Design-Build context, compliance with other laws could
save an enormous amount of resources because the industry is subject
to a plethora of safety regulations.148 For example, construction
workers must adhere to strict safety-harness regulations.149 Absent an
accident, it would still be in the best interest of a company to internally
investigate safety-harness use to ensure everyone utilized the correct
rope length, buckles, or weight class. If, by a miracle, no accident
occurred but the company found many workers violated the
regulations, the company would be allowed to take the steps necessary
to be legally compliant and ensure safety for their workers.
3. Product Liability
The D.C. District Court applied the SCAP in the context of a
product liability suit.150 In Bradley v. Melroe Co., the plaintiff sought
to compel reports resulting from the product makers internal
investigations.151 The reports concerned seven different accidents
involving the same product, which allegedly harmed the plaintiff.152
When analyzing the applicability of the SCAP, the court took special
care to frame the important steps the company took to investigate the
accidents.153
First, the court found the company routinely and deliberately
investigated the accidents for the purposes of ascertaining whether
preventative measures could be taken.154 Second, the court succinctly
explained the type of information that could be protected under the
147. Reichhold Chems. Inc., 157 F.R.D. at 524.
148. OSHA – Workplace Safety and Health Requirements, TEX. WORKFORCE
COMM’N, https://www.twc.texas.gov/news/efte/osha.html [https://perma.cc/WP5DPYP6] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
149. Eric Duncan, OSHA Safety Harness Requirement, LEGAL BEAGLE (Oct. 25,
2017),
https://legalbeagle.com/13635666-osha-safety-harness-requirement.html
[https://perma.cc/92PZ-TC2X].
150. Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992).
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id.
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SCAP as mental impressions, opinions, theories, recommendations,
and evaluations.155 Finding the reports were of this same nature, the
court concluded the SCAP was applicable, resting its conclusions on
the motivating public policy rationales previously mentioned.156
Additionally, the court took special care to define the nature of
the SCAP.157 By comparing the SCAP to the work product doctrine,
the court held it was a qualified privilege.158 Thus, the SCAP applied
subject to the traditional test for qualified privileges at the federal level
wherein the requesting party must show substantial need.159
Ultimately, there was not a showing of substantial need in this case.160
However, the court concluded the underlying facts present in the
reports warranted partial disclosure.161 Even still, the court ordered all
mental impressions, opinions, theories, recommendations, and
evaluations redacted.162
The specific lessons to be drawn from this case reinforce what
the actual protections should be: mental impressions, opinions,
theories, recommendations, and evaluations. A statute should use this
language directly when determining the SCAP’s scope. The Bredice
court and the O’Connor court essentially upheld the SCAP as a
qualified privilege as well. In Bredice, the court stated that an injured
party could show “extraordinary circumstances” amounting to good
cause to permit disclosure.163 As such, regardless of the approach the
statute should take, the SCAP for Design-Build companies should also
be qualified.
C. The Dowling Elements
When constructing a proposed statute for the SCAP, the
different approaches to construction are apparent after analyzing case
law and the different contexts in which it applies. Some courts take
full stock in the type of report and whether the investigation is
mandated or not, as seen in the Block Island Fishing, Inc. court’s
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970).
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application of the O’Connor four-part test.164 Other courts measure the
deliberateness of the self-evaluations before applying the SCAP.165
Another approach to applying the SCAP was set forth in Dowling v.
Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc. This Comment posits the proposed model
SCAP statute should replicate the framework outlined in Dowling.
In Dowling, a seaman sued his employer for negligent
attendance.166 The seaman fell while aboard the ship, severely injuring
his back.167 In discovery, the seaman attempted to compel minutes
from the vessel’s safety committee meetings for a period of two years
prior to accident.168 The trial court denied the motion to compel
because the seaman was not entitled to “delve into the minds of the
committee members.”169 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the decision because the trial court had concluded that the “essential
test” of whether the privilege applies “involves balancing the public
interest protected by the privilege against the plaintiff’s need for the
material to make his case.”170
The Ninth Circuit Court refused to apply the same test used in
the lower court and instead applied a three-factor test often used in
other jurisdictions to determine the SCAP’s applicability.171 Under
this three-factor test, a party asserting the SCAP must demonstrate the
material satisfies the following criteria: (1) it results from a critical
self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2) the
public must have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the
type of information sought; and (3) the information must be of the type
in which allowing discovery would curtail free flow of information.172
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court added the general requirement
that the materials be prepared with the expectation of confidentiality
and that the materials have in fact been kept confidential.173 Case law

164. See Block Island Fishing, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161–65 (D. Mass. 2018).
165. Bradley, 141 F.R.D. at 3 (quoting Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94
F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982)).
166. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 424 (9th Cir. 1992).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 425.
170. Id. at 426.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 425–26.
173. Id. at 426 (citing James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for SelfCritical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 574–76 (1983)).
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interpreting these factors will be helpful to determine a proper course
the statute should take.
First, the protected information must have resulted from a
critical self-analysis.174 Courts utilizing the Dowling elements have
included accident reports, internal reviews, and committee reports as
information resulting from a critical self-analysis.175 For example, in
Gillman v. United States, the court permitted a mental hospital to
withhold information gained through critical self-analysis processes
following the suicide of one of its patients.176 These processes
included broad inquiries conducted by the hospital to determine
whether disciplinary or hospital procedures should be changed.177
Citing the Bredice decision, and essentially following the first criteria
set forth in Dowling, the court ultimately applied the SCAP to the
conclusions drawn from the broad inquiries.178
The first criterion of the Dowling test is essential to the SCAP
framework. As previously mentioned, it is the critical self-evaluation
that gives rise to improvements in the long term. As such, a proposed
SCAP statute should also require the materials be prepared through
self-critical evaluation processes. Thus, this first criterion sets forth
the SCAP’s rule of attachment to protected materials. In the DesignBuild context, this rule of attachment would ultimately protect
accident reports, investigatory reports, and other lessons-learned
reports that could encourage the improvement of safety and quality
practices.
Collectively, the second and third criteria of Dowling state that
the information must be of the type that allowing discovery of would
curtail the flow of information, indicating a strong public interest for
protection.179 Although not citing directly to Dowling, the court in
Granger v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, dissected this criteria in detail by
exploring the general policy underpinnings of the SCAP.180 In
Granger, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel in certain
respects.181 The motion requested compulsion of a committee report
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Joerres, supra note 113, at 16.
53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318–19.
Dowling, 971 F.2d at 423.
116 F.R.D. 507, 508–09 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
See id. at 510–11.
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with the following sections: (1) Accident Analysis; (2) Cause; (3)
Contributing Factors; and (4) Committee Recommendations.182 The
court compelled as to sections 2 and 3 but denied compulsion as to
sections 1 and 4.183 The court granted the motion as to sections 2 and
3 because they clearly encompassed opinions and recommendations
that come within the ambit of the SCAP.184 In other words, the court
protected these sections because they were prepared for the purpose of
protecting the public by instituting practices assuring safer
operations.185 The court denied the motion as to sections 1 and 4
because “[t]he cause of an accident and factors contributing to an
accident are at the heart of [the] action.”186
And finally, the Dowling court adopted the requirement that
the materials must be prepared with the expectation of confidentiality
and have in fact been kept confidential.187 As with many privileges,
this general provision is based upon the rationale that “without
confidentiality, there will be a loss of candor.”188 The court in Peterson
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., reiterated this point by stating, “it
would make little sense to allow material to be protected from
discovery that was not intended to be protected by those originating
it.”189
As stated above, the proposed model statute should incorporate
the criteria set forth in Dowling. Specifically, a general definition
section should set forth the criteria that allow the SCAP to attach. For
example, under the first criterion, the protected information should
result from an analysis of facts pertaining to a specific event or project.
As seen in Gillman, these would include reports relating to specific
accidents or procedures. The proposed SCAP statute should include
the second and third criteria by including a purpose provision
specifying that the purpose of SCAP is to facilitate the free flow of
information to ensure safety and quality improvements in the Design182. Id. at 510.
183. Id. at 511.
184. Id. at 510.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992).
188. James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical
Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 563 (1983).
189. Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich.
1986).
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Build industry. The statute must also include a waiver provision
spelling out the conditions where the privilege is inapplicable, such as
when confidentiality is compromised.
V. THE FAILURE OF ALTERNATIVE PROTECTIONS
Other scholars have noted that businesses may be able to shield
self-critical documents through other and more widely recognized
privileges.190 However, this Comment posits other privileges neither
offer sufficient protections for self-evaluation reports conducted in the
Design-Build space,191 nor are these privileges appropriate for use in
the Design-Build space given their policy underpinnings.192
A. Subsequent Remedial Measures Doctrine
It is not uncommon for scholars to compare the SCAP to the
subsequent remedial measures doctrine.193 The doctrine is codified in
the FRE and bars evidence of subsequent measures that could have
made a harm less likely to occur to prove negligence and culpable
conduct.194 The TRE also contains the same doctrine.195 One can see
the clear parallels between the doctrine of subsequent remedial
measures and the SCAP.
Both doctrines exclude relevant evidence to allow individuals
to prevent future problems by utilizing self-help.196 Similarly, each
method recognizes the basic unfairness in requiring parties to produce
for subsequent lawsuits a “smoking gun” that they created in an
attempt to correct perceived shortcomings internally.197 However,
there are several distinctions between the two doctrines.
First, the subsequent remedial measures doctrine relates only
to admissibility of evidence at trial and not to discoverability, which
is what the self-critical analysis privilege aims to protect.198 The
present, chilling effects of discovery would therefore persist
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Bundy, supra note 132.
See infra Part V.
Id.
Kaiser, supra note 103, at 148.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
TEX. R. EVID. 407.
Jones, supra note 45, at 1639.
Id.
Kaiser, supra note 103, at 148.

254

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

unabated.199 Further, the rule only protects studies or measures that are
taken subsequent to an injury or claim.200 In the case of most lessonslearned reports in the construction industry the investigation often
takes place prior to the incident.201
Second, the purpose of the subsequent remedial measures
doctrine is to encourage individuals to remedy defects that could cause
injury.202 This is a far too narrow policy consideration considering the
SCAP, which is purposed on the idea of preventing injury to others
and encouraging innovations.203 Thus, under the subsequent remedial
measures doctrine, lessons-learned policies would not be well
protected.
B. Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege
Most often, the strongest grounds for protecting internal
information are the attorney-client and the attorney work product
privileges.204 Based on a foundation similar to the SCAP, the attorneyclient privilege protects confidential communications based upon
public policy concerns regarding the chilling effect of disclosure.205
Thus, the attorney-client privilege recognizes that fostering open
dialogue between parties often requires that the communications not
be used as weapons against those involved.206
Empirical evidence shows the attorney-client privilege does
enhance transparency among parties.207 Courts often import this
reasoning into an analysis of the SCAP’s applicability in certain
situations.208 Additionally, the attorney-client privilege protects only
the communications, and not the underlying facts, the same way that
199.
200.
201.
202.

Jenoff, supra note 46, at 604.
Id. at 605.
Ferrad, supra note 28, at 303.
See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE, § 407.03 [1] (Joseph McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
203. Jenoff, supra note 46, at 605.
204. Hope T. Cannon & Kelly E. Jones, Critically Challenged—The Recognition
and Scope of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege, PRESNELL ON PRIVILEGES, 59
https://presnellonprivileges.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/scap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UPL3-G67M] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
205. Jones, supra note 45, at 1634.
206. Id. at 1634–35.
207. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study
of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 244 (1989) (noting that clear majority
of attorneys and CEOs believe that privilege enhances candor).
208. Jones, supra note 45, at 1638.
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the SCAP does.209 However, this privilege falls far short of protecting
lessons-learned reports in the design-build industry.
The attorney-client privilege only applies where a client is
seeking legal advice from counsel, but lessons-learned reports are
often made by corporate employees to better some aspect of project
management.210 Moreover, lessons-learned reports do not solely, or
even primarily, consist of the kind of legal advice that would be
protected by attorney-client privilege.211 Instead, the reports cover a
wide range of topics, such as allocation of hours, deadlines on project
milestones, or delivery procedures.212
Additionally, with respect to the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context, there is “a question of who the client is”.213
Generally, the protection of the privilege only extends to corporate
officers and supervisory personnel.214 Thus, communications by many
of the participants in lessons-learned reports, including the rank and
file employees, would not be protected.215
For similar reasons, the attorney work product doctrine, which
protects documents containing the attorney’s opinions, mental
processes, and opinions of counsel, would not suffice to protect the
reports.216 In addition to sharing the problem with attorney-client
privilege, the attorney work product doctrine only protects documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation.217 Lessons-learned reports are
undertaken proactively rather than in anticipation of litigation and
therefore would fall outside the privilege.218

209. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). (“The [attorneyclient] privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.”)
210. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1).
211. See Lessons learned report for building design and construction, DESIGNING
BUILDINGS, https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Lessons_learned_report_fo
r_building_design_and_construction [https://perma.cc/6EHY-MYZZ] (hereinafter
Lessons Learned Report).
212. Id.
213. See James A. Matthews III, Attorney-Client Privilege Within the Client
Organization - Part I, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 23, 2012),
https://www.foxrothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/Matthews-AttorneyClient-Privilege-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY2N-CEPM].
214. See TEX. R. EVID. 503.
215. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
216. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5(d).
217. Id.
218. Lessons Learned Report, supra note 211.
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Thus, the limitations of the attorney-client or work product
privileges highlight an additional benefit of the SCAP. Mainly, the
SCAP saves time and money because corporate employees may freely
discuss ideas to improve the business without the need for attorneys.
In the Design-Build industry, this is incredibly special because it
would allow multiple architects and construction project managers to
work together without having the expensive and otherwise useless
lawyer present. The SCAP would essentially avoid the “who is
privileged” question and the requirement to seek legal advice.
C. Trade Secret Privilege
Under the TRE, individuals have a privilege to refuse to
disclose or prevent others from disclosing a trade secret.219 A trade
secret is often defined as a formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information that provides one with the opportunity to gain an
advantage over competitors that do not know the information.220 The
person who owns the trade secret, or the person’s agent or employee,
may claim this privilege.221
The trade secret must be confidential, and the information must
not be publicly available or readily ascertainable by independent
investigation.222 In other words, there must be “a substantial element
of secrecy” for the information to constitute a trade secret.223 The
owner is required to take efforts to maintain and protect the secrecy of
the information.224 If a court orders a person to disclose a trade secret,
it must take any protective measure required by the interests of the
privilege holder and the parties and to further justice.225
The trade secret privilege would likely exclude the lessonslearned reports because often times, an outside investigation could
lead to the facts creating the final opinion. Further, trade secrets are
219. TEX. R. EVID. 507.
220. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996).
221. TEX. R. EVID. 507.
222. Richardson & Assocs. v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583,
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factual in nature, often resembling formula or schematics. The final
conclusion or opinion drawn from a lessons-learned investigation
would likely not be covered.
VI. THE PROPOSED STATUTE AND COMMENTARY
DESIGN-BUILD PRIVILEGE OF SELF-CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
Section (a). (Purpose.) The Legislature finds a
strong and compelling rationale for the adoption of
a limited and qualified form of the Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege. This statute enables and
facilitates candid discussion and innovation in the
Design-Build industry.
The Title and Section (a) get to the point right away. Others
have constructed a SCAP statute that would span across multiple
industries and fields.226 But as discussed in Parts II and III, a proposed
model statute in Texas must be narrowly defined.227 Recall further,
that the primary purpose for this statute is to protect lessons-learned
reports.228 In turn, this will enable Design-Build companies to prevent
risks associated with design-defect and employee injury claims.229
Section (b). (Definitions.) As used in this Statute:
1. “Design-Build Business” includes those
companies, businesses, partnerships engaged in the
act of designing or providing construction services
to the general public, as defined by Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. §§ 16.009 and 150.001.
2. “Self-Critical Analysis” are those deliberate
internal reviews, communications, or investigations
into major policy or procedures, conducted by or on
behalf of a Design-Build Business’s management,
which contain or result in subjective mental
impressions,
opinions,
theories,
and
226.
227.
228.
229.

Leonard, supra note 7, at 115.
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part III.
Id.
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recommendations
concerning
the
policy,
procedure, or otherwise compliance with applicable
law, that has been kept confidential among the
Design-Build Business’s management.
3. “Holder of the Privilege” is the Design-Build
Business who engaged in Self-Critical Analysis
prior to the time disclosure is sought.
Section (b)(1) defines the Design-Build actors who may
invoke the SCAP. As discussed in Part III, many of the Design-Build
claims arise under the Texas Civil Practice Code.230
Section (b)(2) incorporates several elements discussed in Parts
III and IV and essentially sets forth the rules of attachment.231 The act
triggering attachment must be deliberate.232 As seen by Texas’s peerreview privileges, there is more weight and acceptance of a privilege
that requires deliberate action.233 In this provision, there is also the
recognition that a business should utilize the SCAP to assess legal
compliance.234 Further, the objects being protected are only subjective
conclusions, allowing for discovery of the underlying facts while
shielding the resulting reports.235
Section (b)(3) includes only those Design-Build actors who
had the ability to and did pursue a self-critical analysis. This limitation
ensures actors will not be compelled to use the SCAP as the workproduct doctrine.
Section (c). (General Rule.) If discovery of a SelfCritical Analysis is sought by an adverse party, the
Holder of the Privilege may refuse to disclose, and
prevent another from disclosing, the Self-Critical
Analysis.
Section (d). (Waiver.) The Privilege is waived to the
extent that the Holder of the Privilege voluntarily
discloses a significant part of the self-critical
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
See discussion supra Part III–IV.
See discussion supra Part II.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part IV.
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analysis or consents to such disclosure by anyone,
except as necessary to further the goals of the
investigation. Consent to disclosure shall be found
if the Holder of the Privilege acts in a manner
inconsistent with an intention to maintain the
Privilege.
Sections (c) and (d) are at the core of the statute. Here, the
confidentiality requirement discussed in Dowling is present.236 The
idea of waiver is that the management structure is in the best position
to effect change to policy or procedure.237
Section (e). (Exception.)
1. Where an adverse party shows the court
Substantial Need or Extraordinary Circumstances,
this Privilege yields to the extent necessary and
compulsion or disclosure may occur.
2. Exceptions to this statute may be created or
modified by a reinterpretation of proceeding
statutes by the highest court of this state or by
subsequent legislation.
Section (e)(1) defines the SCAP as a qualified privilege.
Recall, that many courts applying the SCAP do so as a qualified
privilege.238 Section (e)(2) allows the SCAP to be flexible and
incorporate or be designed to incorporate exceptions found in different
subject-matter codes.239 Recall that as a general observation, this
flexibility of added exceptions was a predominant feature among the
Texas’s privileges.
VII. CONCLUSION
Texas’s Design-Build sector is growing fast. With this trend,
Texas can expect an increase in construct-defect, design-defect, and
construction injury lawsuits. Rather than create economic waste by
236.
237.
238.
239.

See discussion supra Part IV(C).
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.
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encouraging litigious recourse, Texas should adopt a very narrow,
codified form of the SCAP. Doing so will allow Design-Build
businesses to take the steps necessary to prevent defects and injury to
others without fear their internal evaluations will be used against them
at trial.
This Comment proposed a model statute for the Texas
Legislature to adopt. This statute is written in a manner to comport
with traditional notions of fairness, as its application is limited and
qualified. For example, the scope of the SCAP is limited solely to
those subjective evaluations resulting from internal investigations or
the increasingly popular lessons-learned policies. Although the statute
drafted above is limited to the construction industry, it forms the basis
for further extensions into other industries. Specifically, this statute
could easily be modified to other property-related industries such as
product design, manufacturing, or oil and gas production. Texas needs
to encourage others to prevent harm, waste, or loss when possible. It
is time Texas implements a privilege to further this aim.

